Abstract. Information-based argumentation aims to model the partner's reasoning apparatus to the extent that an agent can work with it to achieve outcomes that are mutually satisfactory and lay the foundation for continued interaction and perhaps lasting business relationships. Information-based agents take observations at face value, qualify them with a belief probability and build models solely on the basis of messages received. Using augmentative dialogue that describes what is good or bad about proposals, these agents observe such statements and aim to model the way their partners react, and then to generate dialogue that works in harmony with their partner's reasoning.
Introduction
This paper is in the area labelled: information-based agency [1] . An information-based agent has an identity, values, needs, plans and strategies all of which are expressed using a fixed ontology in probabilistic logic for internal representation and in an illocutionary language [2] for communication. All of the forgoing is represented in the agent's deliberative machinery.
In line with our "Information Principle" [2] , an information-based agent makes no a priori assumptions about the states of the world or the other agents in it -represented in a world model inferred from the messages that it receives. These agents build up their models by comparing expectation with observation -in this way we have constructed general models of trust, honour and reliability in a single framework [1] .
[2] describes a rhetorical argumentation framework that supports argumentative negotiation. It does this by taking into account: the relative information gain of a new utterance and the relative semantic distance between an utterance and the dialogue history. Then [3] considered the effect that argumentative dialogues have on the on-going relationship between a pair of negotiating agents. Neither of these contributions addressed the relationship between argumentative utterances or strategies for argumentation. In this paper we adress these two issues.
The basis of our approach differs from [4] who builds on the notion of one argument "attacking" another. With the exception of a logical 'attack', whether one argument attacks another or not will depend on the receiving agent's private circumstances that are unlikely to be fully articulated. Thus, the notion of attack is of little use to informationbased agents that build their models on the contents of utterances. This paper considers how to counter the effect of the partner agent's arguments, and aims to lead a negotiation towards some desired outcome by persuasive argumentation. This paper is based in rhetorical argumentation [5] . For example, suppose I am shopping for a new car and have cited "suitability for a family" as a criterion. The salesman says "This LandMonster is great value," and I reply "My grandmother could not climb into that." Classical argumentation may attempt to refute the matriarch's lack of gymnastic prowess or the car's inaccessibility. Taking a less confrontational and more constructively persuasive view we might note that this statement impacts negatively on the "suitability for a family" criterion, and attempt to counter that impact possibly with "It's been voted No 1 for children." Although a smarter response may look for an argument that is semantically closer: "The car's height ensures a very comfortable ride over rough terrain that is popular with old people."
Information-based agents build their world models using an expectation/observation framework; this includes a model of the negotiation partner's behaviour. Agents form an a priori expectation of the significance of every event that occurs, and when the effect of that event is finally observed they revise their expectations. The model of behaviour includes measures of: trust, honour, reliability, intimacy, balance and dispositiondisposition attempts to model what the partner means which may not be what they say. These measures are summarised using: temporal criteria, the structure of the ontology, and the illocutionary category of observed utterances.
Our argumentation agent has to perform two key functions: to understand incoming utterances and to generate responses. The approach is founded on a model of contract acceptance that is described in Section 2. Section 3 details a scenario that provides the context for the discussion. Sections 4 and 5 consider the scenario from each side of the bargaining table. Reactive and proactive argumentation strategies are given in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
Contract Acceptance
No matter what interaction strategy an agent uses, and no matter whether the communication language is that of simple bargaining or rich argumentation, a negotiation agent will have to decide whether or not to sign each contract on the table. We will argue in Section 4 that the buyer will be uncertain of his preferences in our Scenario described in Section 3. If an agent's preferences are uncertain then it may not make sense to link the agent's criterion for contract acceptance to a strategy that aims to optimise its utility. Instead, we pose the more general question: "how certain am I that δ = (φ, ϕ) is a good contract to sign?" -under realistic conditions this may be easy to estimate. P t (sign(α, β, χ, δ) ) estimates the certainty, expressed as a probability, that α should sign 1 proposal δ in satisfaction of her need χ, where in (φ, ϕ) φ is α's commitment and ϕ is β's. α will accept δ if: P t (sign(α, β, χ, δ)) > c, for some level of certainty c. To estimate P t (sign(α, β, χ, δ) ), α will be concerned about what will occur if contract δ is signed. If agent α receives a commitment from β, α will be interested in any
